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The blog entry that I was quoting (visually and verbally) in my last "disruptive technologies" slide: Gardner on Hilmar Petursson on Sandboxes and Theme Parks
Gardner is an English professor and the blog entry is actually about education, so it is really quite relevant.
And the post by Cosma Shalizi on what peer review does and doesn't do, in the context of a real-world controversy: Last words on Saletan (with links back to a lot more about the controversy itself).
Hey all, here's couple of readings for my presentation. I'll add a couple more short ones if I can.
1. Digital Communities - great opening - paper peters out at the end, so if you can hit the first couple of pages, that's cool.
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2. Short story by Frederic Brown - "Answers" - cute tale...and did I mention short?
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3. Interesting article by David Pogue reviewing the new XO Laptop - One Laptop Per Child initiative.
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So, this is the crash course on epistemology. I have renamed it to “it-pist-me-off-ogy” just for my pleasure. True, very hard to maneuver through given that my mind is simple and does not work this way (that is why I stay in the historical realm of studies). It is interesting to be reminded how far reaching this type of critical thinking expands. I always thought of epistemology as that section of Humanities that I avoided. I am still trying to figure out if knowledge equals truth or does knowledge only equal a form of knowledge and it only becomes that truth once applied and observed by those testing the knowledge? And if that is true, we must all agree to the meaning of the terms.
This reminded me, correct or not, of a passage from Thomas Jefferson from Notes on Virginia:
“But our rulers can have no authority over such natural rights, only as we have submitted to them. The rights of the conscience we never submitted, we could not submit. We are answerable for them to our God. The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”
As pointed out by Harry V. Jaffa, in Equality and Liberty:
“Here is a crucial consideration: on the premises of the Declaration, only men who have a knowledge of natural right and of the difference between the just and the unjust powers of government can give the enlightened form of consent which alone gives rise to legitimate government…Consent alone can confer legitimacy upon the powers of government, but consent is only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition. Enlightened consent is the necessary and sufficient condition.”
Either way, this was a very interesting reading assignment!!!!!!
Here is a fascinating passage from the posting on Wittgenstein, an encyclopedia commentary on sec. 3.3 of the PI:
<<<"For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word
‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI
43). This basic statement is what underlies the change of perspective most typical of the
later phase of Wittgenstein's thought: a change from a conception of meaning as
representation to a view which looks to use as the hinge of the investigation. Traditional
theories of meaning in the history of philosophy were intent on pointing to something
exterior to the proposition which endows it with sense. This "something" could generally
be located either in an objective space, or inside the mind as mental representation. As
early as 1933 (The Blue Book) Wittgenstein took pains to challenge these dogmas,arriving at the insight that "if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we
should have to say that it was its use" (BB 4). Ascertainment of the use (of a word, of aproposition), however, is not given to any sort of constructive theory building, as in the
Tractatus. Rather, when investigating meaning, the philosopher must "look and see" thevariety of uses to which the word is put. So different is this new perspective that
Wittgenstein repeats: "Don't think but look!" (PI 66); and such looking is done vis a vis
particular cases, not thoughtful generalizations. In giving the meaning of a word, any
explanatory generalization should be replaced by a description of use.">>>
So...meaning (more or less) means usage. The point is then made that the history of philosophy regarding meaning was a series of attempts to position meaning as situated inside the 'container' of the word by positing a pre-existent proposition or object "located either in an objective space, or inside the mind as mental representation," and it was this pre-existent thing that was being pointed to. The reader does the hermeneutic work of opening the box (to continue using the same figure, as it is a classic and ubiquitous one), that is, decoding the semiotic/representational structure of the word/box to find the meaning within -- though actually it is outside -- located elsewhere -- and is the distant object or idea pointed to by the word/meaning complex. The system he is critiquing is ultimately Platonic, of course, and has been subjected to repeated bashings, perhaps most effectively by Nietzsche.
So when we give the "meaning of a word" our tendency is to give an "explanatory generalization," a sort of hermeneutic tag, so to speak -- and I think (I could be way wrong here!) that he means by that a "definition."
Now follow his suggestion and look again at his statement: "For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language"
He defines meaning "THUS" (which may look like a demonstrative adjective but is in fact an "adverb of manner" i.e. "this is how I define meaning") and then gives us the definition, rebelling against his own dictum "In giving the meaning of a word, any explanatory generalization should be replaced by a description of use"! In telling us the meaning of meaning he slips into a nasty little patch of quicksand in his own system, trying to replace definition with description, prescription with experiential usage...
Usage, by definition, is always subjected to hermeneutic defining. Hermeneutics is always description and description is always hermeneutics.
By the way, I agree with Wittgenstein on this particular issue. I assume "meaning" is in the smaller class of cases!
Talk about a crash course in knowing what I now know that I didn’t know I knew!! I felt ungrounded in the basic information on epistemology and it was quite difficult for me to get through it. However, it became easier and I began to understand the tenets of the process of knowledge production and I do appreciate all the foundational readings.
The readings for Monday’s presentation intersect with many issues that interest me in regards to gatekeeping structures in various locations. If we get to the heart of why and how gatekeeping practices predominate, one identifies similarities with the creation, validation, and maintenance of knowledge. I believe that was readily evident in the Feminist Epistemology readings. I too believe that evidence supports that what is known and needs to be known are products of “power politics.” Even if the initial drive for the attainment of knowledge were not to create a hierarchy of privilege and access, the eventual dynamic creates that separation and a cyclic and expanding practice moves forth. This is supported with the authors proposal that, “experiential differences lead to differences in perspective.”
I was left with the impression that epistemological circles are still at a budding stage when it comes to differentiated knowers. If we take the standpoint of a constructive constructivism then we must admit a factual situation of a socio-economic divide was the product of an attainment of knowledge that lead to the access, and limitation, to and individual’s success. Moreover, the knowledge that was the cantilever to that separation was socially derived through the norms and practices of the empowered at the time. Definite ramblings in my mind, yet I felt support through Alison Wylie’s assertion, “certain subdominant standpoints offer epistemic advantages in particular fields of knowledge.” I was left wanting to know more on this point and, yet I was not able to find the reference used in the article. This is an area I would like to discuss further in Monday’s presentation.| << Older | Page 1 of 6 |
